back.Publicações
Alfa-Ibis Symposium 26-9 Jan 1999
 
Day 1:
Globalisation, Adjustment and Spatial Change

GLOBALIZATION YESTERDAY AND TODAY
Csaba Deák
 
 

Changes … generally take a long time in secret before they suddenly make themselves felt on the surface. A clear survey of the economic history of a given period can never be attained contemporaneously, but only subsequently…
Engels, 1885, p.9
‘Globalisation’ is one of the most successeful catchwords of neo-liberalism since ‘privatization'. Its precise meanings remains to be established, but whatever that is, it claims –or should claim, to command any respect– to 1. be referring to a new development in contemporary societies across the world, and 2. be illuminating for an understanding of the nature of the transformations the aforesaid societies are currently undergoing and for an assessment of the prospects open to the same.

An exploration of its meaning and an assessment of such claims might follow three main steps. The first, a summing up the concrete processes which have been ascribed as leading to, or stemming from or yet making up globalization; then the second, to confront these with a historical perspective of contemporary capitalism; to then in the third step proceed to a qualification of the theoretical status of the concept of globalization. This is the plan of this paper, with an addition: in the end, it refers to the specificities of the meaning and the role of ‘globalization’ in peripheral countries, in the example of Brazil.
 

What globalization is

Let us sum up of what has been described as being the main elements of globalization in the overabundant literature on the latter (which frequently include some sort of criticism, even though mostly half-hearted). One good account of them comes from Stephen Gill (1993),(1) from which the data on world exports in the table below are taken.

Table 1/a
Exports, FOB, billions of current US$
 
1950 1960 1970 1980
Trilateral
 34.0 
81.0 
214.0 
1224.3
US
 10.1 
20.4 
42.6 
220.7
Japan 
 0.8
 4.1
 19.3 
130.5
W.Europe tot
20.1 
51.0 
136.0
 806.1
W.Europe ext
n.a
 25.6 
44.1 
256.1
West Germany 
2.0 
11.4 
34.2
 192.9
United Kingdom
6.3
 10.6
 19.3
 115.2
World total 
60.8 
128.3
 313.9
 1855.7

Table 1/b
Exports, as proportion of GNP and of world total
                                                 % of GNP                            % of world exports
1950
 1980 
1950
 1980
Trilateral 
 7.3 
 17.2 
 55.9 
 66.0 
US
 3.5 
 8.4 
 16.7 
 11.9 
Japan 
 5.6 
12.5 
 1.3 
 7.0 
W.Europe tot
13.8 
 25.1 
  33.1 
 43.4 
W.Europe ext
 n.a 
8.0 
n.a 
 13.8 
West.Germany
8.5 
23.5 
 3.3 
 10.4 
United.Kingdom 
17.0 
22.2 
 10.4 
 6.2 
World total 
11.7
 21.2
 100.0
 100.0
Notes: Trilateral= USA, Canada, EEC and Japan. Western Europe tot: including intra-European trade. Western Europe ext: excluding intra-European trade. ‘World’ total excludes inter-trade amongst: China, Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam (from 1976, Vietnam).
Source: M Ushiba et al (1983) Sharing international responsabilities Trilateral Commission, New York, quoted in Gill (1993).

The two really striking developments shown in these tables are an about six-fold increase of world trade volumes in real terms (allowing for about 365% inflation during the period), equivalent to an average rate of growth of about 4.8% yearly; and a drop of the US’ share in it from 17% to 12%, more than offset by an increased share of both Europe and Japan, so that the central (‘Trilateral’) countries’ share rose about 20%. Further, in a concluding section, Gill refers to qualitative changes that would have led to globalization: The turn of the decade fundamentally transformed the global economic, political and military landscape. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the Gulf War, and finally the intensification of European integration: these changes were crucial componenets of an unprecedented redrawing of the geopolitaical map of the globe (p.272, my emphasis). To these one might add a deepening of cross-boundaries interwovenness of capital (without, however, any corresponding international mobility of labour), a relative increase of the weight of financial services in GNP-s and some build-up of supranational State-like institutions.

These are portentous transformations; however to hail them as ‘unprecedented’ makes one wonder whether the Thirty Years’ War, for example, was not fought for too little. A striking feature of both quantitative and qualitative changes invoked above is their short-sightedness: their reference is in fact a relatively short period of growth (which appeared to many at the centre of world capitalism as prosperity and stability) allowed by post-war reconstruction. Putting them into a broader historical perspective should allow a reassessment of such transformations.
 

Before globalization, or: what is really new

To start with, this is perhaps the place to recall that in the view of Samir Aminglobalization started in earnest by 1492 and became rapidly dominated and later associated for good with capitalism as such – although I would not imply as he seems to do, that either of the two gave birth to the other:

(If we are required to pick a date to mark the birth of the modern world,) I should choose 1492, the year in which the Europeans began their conquest of the planet –military, economic, political, ideological, cultural, and even, in a certain sense, ethnic. But the world in question is also a world of capitalism, a new social and economic system, qualitatively different from all previous systems in Europe and elsewhere. These two traits are inseparable, and this facts call into question all analysis of and responses to the crisis of modernity that fail to recognize their simultaneity.(2)
Samir Amin, 1992
The planetary empires carved out by European countries in succession (in which "the sun did not set") were certainly ‘global’, as were the rivalries and wars that went with the bid by competing countries for world domination, of which the Thirty Years’ War referred to earlier was one and brought no less change than the demise of the Iberian empires and the rise of the Channel countries (France, Holland and England) to world predominance. Compared to this, the changes referred to above by Gill are minor adjustments rather than ‘unprecedented redrawing’ in the geo-political configuration of word capitalism. As to the expansion of international trade and its concentration, let us recall that it is no more than a recomposition after the disruptions caused by World Wars I and II. In fact, British exports (which then made up two-thirds of world exports) climbed from just 5-6% of the National Product in 1688 to about 9-11% during most of the first half of the nineteenth (with a temporary swell to 14% during the Napoleonic Wars), to then rise to a peak of 23% by 1870 – a figure approached only by Germany and the UK itself in 1980, and then they were not the biggest GNP of the world. This was the US, with a meek 8.4% share of exports in its GNP. And that quite apart from the fact that the US never achieved even one-third of total world trade, half of what Britain had mustered at the height of its power.

As for financial expansion, it became so important already after the restructuring of capitals during the Great Depression of 1875-95 that Engels, having sensed it, thought it worth providing a supplement to his edition (1895) of the third volume of Capital entitled "The stock exchange" (the word ‘finance capital’ was to be coined later for the same thing). Then in a rapid succession, Hobson produced Imperialism (1902), Hilferding Finance capital (1910) and Bukharin Imperialism and world economy (1915). By the same time arose also the controversy over ultra-imperialism or inter-imperialist rivalry. At issue was the question whether there could be a ‘peaceful capitalism’, as sustained by Kaustky and his social democrats. Lenin summed it up in his "Introduction"to Bukharin's Imperialism and world economy with his usual verve:

Particularly as regards Kautsky, his open break with Marxism has led him to dream about a "peaceful capitalism". If the name of ultra-imperialism is given to international unification of national (or, more correctly, state-bound) imperialisms which would be able to eliminate the most unpleasant, the most disturbing and distasteful conflicts such as wars, political convulsions etc, which the petty bourgeois is so much afraid of, then why not turn to innocent dreams of a comparatively peaceful, comparatively conflictless, comparatively non-catastrophic ultra-imperialism?
Lenin, 1915
If we add Ernest Mandel’s Late capitalism, Aglietta’s A theory of capitalist regulation and van der PIJL’s The making of the Atlantic ruling class, of which the latter is the most recent and it is already more than fifteen years old, we have a framework for analysis and interpretation of contemporary capitalism that account for most of its main characteristics. Thus world trade, finance capital, imperialism, the question of transnational formations and an interpretation of contemporary society as late or intensive stage of capitalism are all available for an account of current developments within a historical perspective and from the framework of dialectical materialism. That is a great deal indeed to throw away for an empty abstraction such as globalization.
 

What globalization means

One of the great events of ‘globalization’ was the signing of a new GATT after the ‘Uruguay round’ of negotiations or eight years of haggling, on 15 December 1993. It gave good examples of the elementary fact that its meaning depends on who is looking at or speaking of it. In particular, the meaning of GATT was anything but ‘global’. Thus, the central countries' representative commemorated:

Today the world chose opening and cooperation instead of uncertainty and conflict.
Peter Sutherland, GATT, Director-General (3)
... while less enthousiastic echoes came from ex-colonies: Frankly, we must say that the results of the Uruguay Round left us at times with mixed feelings.
Luiz Felipe Lampréia, Ambassador of Brazil to GATT GM,931516:1 (ibid.)
"He was not alone in this austere mood" – reported the main business newspaper in Brazil. –"The developing nations [sic] in general complained that they got very few concessions especially in agriculture and textiles."
Id. (ibid).
Divergence over the interterpretation of the current process does not prevent the ‘concept’ of globalisation and its companions from rising to hegemony. In stead of capitalism --and its crisis--, we got globalization, sustainable growth (forever?) and the end of history. Being a-historical abstractions, these pseudo-concepts prevent interpretation, critique and scope for change of the current state of society. In this way, globalization may not have a meaning, but it does serve a purpose: the maintenance of the status quo in contemporary society. In practical terms, globalization is either presented as cause of unpalatable effects of the current crisis –Is there increasing ‘social exclusion’ anywhere? Blame it on globalization– or it is posited as an ultimate contingency that forces otherwise well-meaning governments to take such measures as cutback on welfare, ‘deregulation’ which leaves free hand to big capital or the dismantlement of labour organization. In this way it hinders political action of the individual or the development of social forces which would challenge the worst effects of class domination: how could a society within a nation-State stand up to such ‘general trends’ as globalization etc, which transcend the national level?

The name of such produce, ideas which promote inaction, offer an apology of the existing order, and thereby promote the maintenance of the status quo, is ideology. Any contribution to ideology is of course a precious reinforcement to the edifice of contemporary society, the ‘governability’ of which became a concern since the exhaustion of the post war boom by the late 1960s.
 

Globalization, in the centre and the periphery

In this light ‘globalisation’ appears as an ideological product which along with its companion pseudo-concepts litters much of the academic and intellectual production in social science. Somewhat surprisingly, it performs the same role –that is, reproduction of the status quo-- at both ends of world capitalism: at the centre of world accumulation or at its periphery. The difference is in what is being justified/reproduced: bourgeois society with its intensive accumulation there, elite society with its hindered accumulation(4) here.

At this point the advantage of a meaningless word (a pseudo-concept) comes into full light. Globalisation can be invoked to justify financial deregulation in central countries as easily as fixed exchange rates coupled to central bank administered 25%-plus interest rate in the periphery; it can prompt heavy government spending in R&D and in physical infrastructure (liberalism notwithstanding) there and squander public assets by ‘selling’ them out to private capitals, home based or foreign, here. In the urban agglomerations, it can justify massive investment in infrastructure for high finance and big capital headquarters, preparing competitive ‘world cities’ in the core of world capitalism, whereas it can also vindicate the lack of the most elementary investment in the name of depleted resources of a nation in view of the requirements of global integration, at the periphery. While it argues for increase in productivity of labour without a corresponding rise of the subsistence level at the core, it can be invoked just as easily in favour of the reproduction of the hindrances to the development of the productive forces in the periphery. Only in one thing it is the same anywhere: in being an excuse for policies aimed at the reproduction of the status quo, and in trying to make people believe that those policies are unavoidable.
 
 

Notes

(1)  A short list chosen among those taking a more critical stance could include Samir Amin (1992, among the most clearly critical), Les Budd (1998, which includes implications on urbanism) or Henk Overbeek’s anthology (1993, which includes Gill just referred to)  but the literature on globalization is really extensive.

(2)  Irrespective of such close analytical association of  Europeans and capitalism (could there be such thing as a European ideology?), it is worth remembering that whatever is happening nowadays, it happens in and to capitalism.

(3)Gazeta Mercantil, 93.12.16:1 "Diminui o protecionismo". GATT: General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, renamed shortly after WTO: World Trade Organization

(4)  An elite society, of colonial extraction, must perpetuate the pattern of colonial production (in which a good part of the surplus is constantly creamed off by the metropole), by submitting the imperative of accumulation in capitalist production to the principle of surplus expatriation (whereby accumulation becomes permanently hindered, whence its name) or else lose the material basis of its reproduction and face its own transformation into bourgeois society (see Deák, 1988).
 

References

AGLIETTA, Michel (1976) A theory of capitalist regulation New Left Books, London, 1979

AMIN, Samir (1992) "1492" Monthly Review 44 (3):10-19

BUDD, Leslie (1998) "Territorial competition and globalization: Scylla and Charybdis of European cities" Urban Studies 35-4:663-85

DEÁK, Csaba (1985) Rent theory and the price of urban land/ Spatial organization in a capitalist economy PhD Thesis, Cambridge

DEÁK, Csaba (1988) "The crisis of hindered accumulation in Brazil" BISS 10 -Bartlett International Summer School, Cidade do México, Proceedings BISS 10, London, 1989

EDWARDS, Michael (1980) "Notes for analysis of land use planning" The production of built environment, Vol.I Bartlett School of Architecture and Planning, London

Engels, Friedrich (1885) "Introduction" in Marx, Karl (1850) The class struggles in France 1848-50 Progress, Moscow, 1979

GILL, Stephen (1993) "Neo-liberalism and the shift towards a US-centred transnational hegemony" in Overbeek, Henk (Ed, 1993) Restructuring hegemony in the global political economy/ The rise of transnational neo-liberalism in the 1980s Routledge, London

LENIN, Vladimir I (1915) "Introduction" to BUKHARIN, Nikolai (1915) Imperialism and world economy Merlin, London, 1972

Monthly Review, The Editors (1992) "Globalization – to what end? Parts I-II" Monthly Review 43 (9-10)

PIJL, Kees van der (1984) The making of the Atlantic ruling class Verso, London
 

Notes (1)  A short list chosen among those taking a more critical stance could include Samir Amin (1992, among the most clearly critical), Les Budd (1998, which includes implications on urbanism) or Henk Overbeek’s anthology (1993, which includes Gill just referred to)  but the literature on globalization is really extensive.

(2)  Irrespective of such close analytical association of  Europeans and capitalism (could there be such thing as a European ideology?), it is worth remembering that whatever is happening nowadays, it happens in and to capitalism.

(3)Gazeta Mercantil, 93.12.16:1 "Diminui o protecionismo". GATT: General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, renamed shortly after WTO: World Trade Organization

(4)  An elite society, of colonial extraction, must perpetuate the pattern of colonial production (in which a good part of the surplus is constantly creamed off by the metropole), by submitting the imperative of accumulation in capitalist production to the principle of surplus expatriation (whereby accumulation becomes permanently hindered, whence its name) or else lose the material basis of its reproduction and face its own transformation into bourgeois society (see Deák, 1988).
 
 

Appendix
Government spending as percentage of GNP/GDP,1880-1985
Selected countries
Year
Britain
Germany 
France
Japan
Sweden 
US
1880
10
10
15
11
6
8
1929
24
31
19
19
8
10
1960
32
32
35
18
31
28
1985
48
47
52
33
65
37
World Bank, World Development Report 1991, Washington


back.Topo
back.Publicações