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  Versão em português                                                                        Soundings 18:41-52 Summer/Autumn 2001 


The Partido dos Trabalhadores in São Paulo
Csaba Deák
 

 

.Participation
.Democracy: social, liberal or direct?
.The local versus central
.Democracy in an elite society

At the beginning of October last year the biggest South American metropolis –and the heart of the Brazilian economy– elected as a mayor Marta Suplicy of the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores, the Workers' Party). From the beginning of the campaign for the second ballot, Suplicy had been the favourite to win, having polled more than than twice as many votes as her nearest rival in the first round, when there were more than ten candidates, including former PT mayor 'hard core' Luiza Erundina. (There is a second ballot every time there is no candidate with an overall majority in the first, a play-off between the two most popular first-round candidates.)

Yet it was not all plain sailing. Though Suplicy is widely seen as a 'pink' socialist, being of patrician extraction and aligned to the 'lighter' version of the PT, the 'right' were extremely concerned at the prospect of her election. Moreover, the 'centre' collapsed in disarray. All this meant that the anti-PT forces managed to scrape together a respectable number of votes in the second ballot, in spite of the fact that their candidate was utterly unpopular, being widely seen as a ruthless and rather blunt representant of elite interests. (He had been reponsive for building expensive road artwork at the expense of public transport, and for organising favela removals while building Potemkin façades masquerading as 'social housing ensembles'; he had also left the education and health  services in a shambles, even though public debt doubled during his administration.) This unpopular candidate still managed to poll an impressive (and somewhat worrying) 41%. This still left room for a comfortable victory for Marta Suplicy, but it was not quite the landslide that had been expected. Nevertheless, significantly, and perhaps more importantly, the PT increased its number of representatives in the Council by 8 –it now has 17 seats out of a total of 55. This is a very significant improvement for a Council long notorious for corruption and largely in thrall to a small number of big building contractors, estate developers and bus companies.

In what follows I will try to sum up the possibilities open to Suplicy's administration, looking at the probable trends in the direction of urban policy, and the prospects for change in Brazilian society more widely– as well as raising a number of associated questions along the way.
 

Participation

One of the key issues faced by PT administrations across Brazil is the question of 'popular participation' in the running of the city. This has been a very important question for the PT's immensely popular Tarso Genro, who during the same election won a landslide victory in Porto Alegre, a State capital in southern Brazil where there have already been three successive PT governments. As has been the case with other PT administrations in the city, popular participation has always been a distinctive feature of Genro's Porto Alegre, and he focuse on it yet again as the central issue of his election campaign.

There have been some successes --but also some inevitable problems--  in the PT's campaign to increase the participation of citizens in the administration of their cities. Thus in the case of Porto Alegre (and in other PT governed-cities the situation has been very simuilar), it could be argued that the scale of such participation has not been very large. The proportion of the budget over whose allocation local communities can in some form have a say amounts to no more than 3 to 5% of the total. But though this may not seem a big percentage, it seems more if one recalls the proportion inevitably taken up by other necessary expenditures, such as running public services, paying civil servants and servicing debt, which combine to take up at least 70% of the budget, and not unfrequently can take up 100%. The amoount left over after paying for these necessities depends mainly on the last item, which in turn depends on the level of indebtedness of the local government or municipality in question. Thus there will be at most 30% of the budget available for further allocatioon, although even then there will always be some part of it already earmarked for some previously decided purpose. In this light, 3-5% appears quite significant. And it is more significant yet if  we take into account the very real effects that result from being involved in the decision-making process, the formation of discussion groups in all sorts of (civic) associations and the feeling of participation that this induces in those taking part. Again, however, this can easily be construed as demagogy: fixing a bit more of the pavement in front of Jones' house rather than Smiths' doesn't make any real difference to social development.

In addition to the question of participation, in São Paulo there is likely to be another major focus: namely, 'regionalization'. The São Paulo Metropolitan Region is currently made up of 39 municipalities (boroughs), each whith an elective council and mayor. The city of São Paulo is by far the biggest of these in just about any respect: its population is 10 million people, out of a regional total of 18 million, and it has the third largest budget of the country --after that of the federal government itself and of São Paulo State. The city of São Paulo is currently divided into 28 administrative units or 'regional' districts', each of which has an average population of about 350 000, though quite a few of them number over half million. Per capita income at US$ 12 000 a year is the double of Brazilian average but less than half of European levels.
 
 

The 39 boroughs of the São Paulo Metropolitan Region: in red, São Paulo itself, within which Regional Administrations are also shown. In light yellow, the urban agglomeration itself (built-up area).

The regionalization programme envisages the transformation of these 'regional' administrative units into sub-prefectures (boroughs), which will have more self-government and more resources. This is an old idea that was very popular during the last (1988-92) PT administration in São Paulo, when there was even consideration given to the idea that the 'Regionals' should have elected governing bodies. That programme was shelved by subsequent right-wing administrations, but is almost certain that a new attempt to implement it will now be made. Marta Suplicy certainly did say this when she was a candidate.
 

Democracy: social, liberal or direct?

'Participative planning' in local governments raises the rather broader issue of  democracy itself, and this is made of even greater interest by the numerous electoral victories of the PT across Brazil as well as in São Paulo. However, although nobody is against democracy, very few two people would agree about what exactly it is.

The name itself, democracy, is a little baffling. For it means the rule of the people, but if the people are in power, over who, or what, could they extend their rule? In fact the word was borrowed from the Greeks by nascent bourgeois society in capitalist economies, and is meant to suggest that all men and women in a democratic society are equal. Since this flies in the face of social practice and everyday experience, liberal ideology –bourgeois social 'theory'– does not say as much, stating only that in a democracy all men and women have the same rights ('all are equal before the law'). And when it comes to the political forms which rule the life of such a society, everyone has the same right to have a say. However, since it is not possible for every member of society express his/her will directly, they elect representatives who speak in their names (and in the name of their interests). This is representative democracy, also known as liberal democracy – in liberal ideology the best (or least bad) available social organization of society.

Critiques of representative democracy argue that in practice the interests of less powerful people will always be hijacked by the greater influence of the dominant class, whose interests thus will always ultimately prevail. Lenin went as far as to say that democracy was the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. I tend to agree with this position, but also feel that the alternative known as direct democracy1 is a utopian notion in a bourgeois society – and most probably in any society: one has only to recall the experience of the now extinct 'actually exisitng socialist' societies of Eastern Europe.

But before leaving the question of representative/ direct democracies, let us recall a third form of democracy, namely, social democracy. In fact, this is not a 'variant' of the former type. It is a proposition that was born amid the transformations that took place in capitalist society during the last part of the nineteenth century. At the time, after centuries of rapid, even spectacular, growth, which had seen the world-wide spread of capitalism –the period of extensive accumulation–, there was suddenly no room for more expansion and the Great Depression set in which lasted twenty years (1875-95). This was the time when ideas about social democracy began to be discussed, at the beginning of the transition to a new stage of capitalism.

During the twentieth century, especially after the second world war, it became clear that the new forms of capitalism which were developing were nothing like 'classical' capitalism of the industrial revolution or the Victorian Age. One important change was that there was now definitely no new room for expansion –the whole world had already been conquered by wage labour and commodity production. This meant that any increase in commodity production could only proceed through an increase of the productivity of labour. This was, in fact, a new stage of capitalism, called the stage of intensive accumulation, or, for short, the intensive stage.

One of the crucial things about this intensive stage –which is that of contemporary capitalism– is the crucial role of techniques and technical progress, which are the sole source of growth (and therefore, of profit). As a result, the level of subsistence of workers is greatly increased: more health, more education, more leisure, a better urban environment, all are necessary to operate the increasingly sophisticated productive processes and provide an equally increasing variety of services in the greatly reduced working day. This is the material basis of the welfare state –according to the empirical taste of the British– and of the more explicit political form –as espoused by the Germans– of social democracy.

Social democracy is one the most controversial propositions for social practice in capitalism, and it has already been debated for over a century, starting with Kautsky's arguments with Engels, and later with Luxemburg and Lenin. Ultimately, the question comes down to this: can there be socialism, or some socialism, in capitalism? In theoretical terms there can hardly be an affirmative answer to this, but the spectacular rise of subsistence levels at the centres of world capitalism made many people feel that theoretical discussion was irrelevant and academic – what mattered was that most people lived much better than before, and this could be construed as some measure of socialism.

And it may well turn out that these questions are academic for another reason: if social democracy is a political form consistent with the intensive stage of capitalism, and if this stage is now drawing to its end. Production is well on its way to become fully automatised – in a process which has been rather loosely referred to as de-industrialisation. This means that society will no longer be organized, as it is now, on the basis of, and around the production of commodities for profit. This is not the place to conjecture about a society in which manufactured goods are in abundance, and people go about performing services and spending leisure time. But surely such a society will not any more be organised on the basis of commodity production or wage labour; so, in other words, it will not be a capitalist society any more. Thus the long-term prospect for social democracy is that it will vanish with capitalism itself. However we at the periphery leave such questions to those at the centre to wonder about. It is time to return to the present and immediate future, which is still part of the era of social democracy – or in the case of Brazil, the era of the impending transition to social democracy.
 

The local versus central

Both democracy and participation ('participative planning') are key issues in the relationship between local units or regions and the greater whole to which they belong. This is even more true in São Paulo, because of the administrative mess it is in: none of the three levels of government (municipal, state, federal) coincides with the metropoltan area, which is smaller than the state but bigger than the municipality; and the Metropolitan entity which was created thirty years ago, specifcally to deal with this problem, was seriously weakened after only ten years, to a point of hardly existing at all except on paper.

As well as antagonisms created by class divides, or even by mere clash of interest groups, there are antagonisms which stem from the sheer scale of both space and society itself. For example, at the national level we have such a clash in the conflict between the national need to build a dam for a power plant and the local people whose life it would disrupt. The same clashes occur in the city – let's think only of the simple cases of building roads and airports or preserving the basin of a water reservoir. Of course there is always the possibility of 'compensation', its size being the result of the balance of forces between the locals and the greater whole (the nation, the city). But the point is that both the need for the course of action and the amount of  'compensation' will be decided at the level of central planning; there is little choice left for the local community, apart from the decision on whether to comply willingly or unwillingly. Which says a lot on the possibilies for local autonomy.

On the other hand there are issues that are clearly best resolved at the local level. This is the case for most of land use planning and building regulation, and also for the administration of local infrastructure and services (such as street maintenance, water supply and sewage, and even the basics of  education and  health service). In fact, such issues can not really be resolved at the central level, for this would require an unthinkable level of data/ intelligence gathering at the centre simply to get to grips with the local situation, let alone to deliberate and take all the necessary decisions. This was one of  the practical problems of centrally planned 'existing socialism' in post-war Eastern Europe. All decisions, from big to small, had to climb through all the échelons right up to the top, and over time this resulted in a bureaucratic structure so cumbersome that it gradually developed functioning principles aimed primarily at its own preservation. As these principles gradually overwhelmed the original purpose of the bureaucracy, namely, supporting (socialist) society, the whole structure ended up by losing its very reason for existence and, ultimately, falling apart.

The great question, of course, is how to find the right level of centralization: to avoid creating a momentum towards excessive centralisation: but equally, to ensure that the pendulum does not swing too far in the other direction which could result in anarchy.Unfortunately there are hardly any theoretical answers to such questions, so that these have to be found in social practice. England, for instance, has long experience of relatively strong local government, from which the PT administrations in São Paulo and across Brazil could usefully learn.

One lesson that can be learned is the danger that can be posed to local bodies by national interests in direct conflict with the local community. The administrative bodies of local communities –perhaps precisely because of the greater degree of participation allowed– are often to the left of central governments (recall the famous red towns of Italy from the 1960s to the 1980s, or Ken Livingstone's s GLC). If such local polities become too strong, they may become a threat to the policies of the ruling class which can be more clearly expressed in the central government (precisely because it is less participatively 'democratic'). For this reason, such bodies may even be eliminated, as was the case with the immensely popular GLC, abolished by Thatcher in 1985; or they can be pulverized, split up into smaller units, so that they cease to be a nuisance. This is common practice in Brazil: when a big industrial concern intends to settle in a large urbanized area, a new county (municipality) is often carved out for it, with a small population, which will thus only be able to sustain a weak administrative structure; this means that industry can have a free hand in all the local decisions that matter (e.g. local taxes, pollution control). The interests of business can be served through elimination or dismemberment, but the 'solution' will always be carried out in the name of decentralization and more 'localism', more democracy… Thus the nature of the relationship between 'local' and 'central' will be the result of social practices in any given society.
 

Democracy in an elite society

Whatever lessons in democracy Brazil or the PT might learn from central social democratic societies, however, they would have to be used in very different circumstances. Brazil is an elite society, utterly different from bourgeois society in many ways – and one glaring difference concerns the question of democracy. In fact the elite is as undemocratic as it can be – and this is not only a question of degree. Just as surplus expatriation –a constant creaming off of the national surplus– is a negation of accumulation, and the superprivileges of the elite are a negation of Commonwealth, so at the political level the behaviour of the elite constantly negates any notion of public interest, equality before the law, and many other principles basic to democracy. The elite makes (ridiculously ambitious, many and/or elaborate) laws just to break them, thus reasserting its authority in both movements: it can make the law and it can break it the next moment. Here is how a literary critique refers to the elite as portrayed by the first great Brazilian novelist Machado de Assis after Independence (1822):

(Thus) life in Brazil imposed upon the bourgeois conscience a series of acrobatics which scandalise and irritate common sense Under such circumstances, as well as an offense an offense is also the norm, and as well as a norm the norm is also an offense... In  this way, the Europeanized sectors of Brazilian society did take part in bourgeois civilization, although in a peculiar, semi-detached way, whereby they invoked it and defied it, alternately and indefinitely.

Roberto Schwartz: Um mestre na periferia do capitalismo, 19792


Thus, if democracy is the political form proper to bourgeois society, built on the idea of commonwealth and the concrete equality of citizens before the law, in elite societies this becomes a farce because the overprivilege of the elite completely belies the notion of commonwealth, and equality before the law simply does not obtain. Populism may be a useful name for what democracy becomes in elite societies. What this means in practical terms is that the concept of scarcity is constantly promoted, and 'lack of resources' is invoked to justify underinvestment in infrastructure. At the national level this leads to weaknesses in the infrastructures of production, and in urban agglomerations it causes the virtual abandonment of low income districts to their own resources. It also weakens the state apparatus, through low and regressive taxation and cumbersome legislation, and this in turn means that it can be easily manipulated by individual members of the elite, in their direct interest (as opposed to the mediate forms of control, in the interest of capitalists as a class, as occurs in a bourgeois society). This raises the question of what might be produced by an attempt to transpose social democracy into an elite society – 'social populism'? All tentative attempts to adapt social democracy to the Brazilian situation are, in fact, in serious danger of resulting, at best, in something like social populism.

Thus, to the extent that the Partido dos Trabalhadores follows de facto, if not necessarily in words, the social democratic credo, the future of its administrations in São Paulo and elsewhere across the country is likely to be problematic. And it will be more so if they do keep to a left trajectory. It is also worth remembering that, a decade ago, PT mayor Luisa Erundina (now in the Socialist Party) presided over what, without a shadow of doubt, was one of  the best administrations ever in São Paulo, but she was subjected to such a barrage of scorn –or else silence– in the major newspapers and other media that it all but neutralized the political effects of her achievements. Furthermore, the growing political strength of the Workers' Party, which makes the election of a PT President in 2002 a concrete possibility, has already led to the preparation of countermeasures, in an attempt to ensure that such a president will wield less power than their more reliable predecessors. One such measure is a mooted increase in the independence of the central bank, which is currently under the direct command of the Executive. In fact this has been discussed for years, but now rumours are becoming more persistent about the preparations for making the central bank solely responsible for decision-making on a range of important financial questions, including interest rate. The plan is to make it sufficiently independent to be able to produce a recession or, as the case may be, a way out of one– irrespective of the government in office. It would be no surprise to see such measures to pass into law  by October or November 2002 – that's last minute before elections… And there may well be similar measures, such as the  fixing by law of monetary and inflationary targets, and budget deficits, or the signing of international commitments within Mercosul or Alca (Nafta) or yet even with the IMF. It is even possible, although less likely, that such measures will be written into the Constitution –as was the case with the peso/dollar parity in Argentina.

However, the reproduction of elite society is not unproblematic, of course; nor is such a society free from antagonisms. In particular, as the balance of payments problems continue –largely caused by indiscriminate import of consumption, and especially of capital goods– it becomes ever more difficult not to allow home-based production to develop. This will mean that the old structures of elite superprivilege, and the archaic power relations which support them, will come under increasing strain, challenged by developing productive forces seeking further and unhindered development. One possible interpretation of the spread of the PT, and the party's victories in the most recent by-elections, is that new forces and organisational forms –which look more 'bourgeois-like'– are emerging in what is now an almost wholly urbanized society. (A very serious caveat to this, however, is that although the strength of capital in manufactures and services has greatly increased at the expense of those in agriculture, there has been no corresponding increase in the strength of a  Brazilian bourgeoisie at the expense of the old-style elite (coronelato). This is because a substantial part of this increased capital is under foreign control, and thus does not give rise to corresponding social forces in Brazil.) At the urban level, this might lead to an overcoming of some of the age-old structural shortcomings of spatial organization, but this should not be confounded with the notion of a 'modernization' according to the neo-liberal recipe (network cities prepared by strategic planning for global traders in an all-encompassing process of globalisation).

For what are the great problems of the metropolis? Certainly there is extreme income concentration, unemployment and misery, but these affect the country as a whole; they are not particular to urban agglomerations. The main problem in relation to spatial organization –which can be considered as an 'urban' problem– is the precarious provision of infrastructure items. Although this also can be seen as symptomatic of a national Brazilian problem –the habit of  constantly justifying the weakening of the productive structures by the refrain 'poor country, poor infrastructure', as referred to earlier–, it also has specifically urban components, such as the lack of a rapid transport system – building on the underground system in São Paulo stopped eleven years ago and when work started again it did so, unbelieveably, on an unconnected stretch of about 8 kilometres, way out in the periphery, more than 25 km away from the centre. This was instead of what was the obvious priority, a 'fourth line' going towards the South West of the city, through the high income districts and along the 'new centres'… 
 

Greater São Paulo Building of the Underground stopped in 1989 (heavy blue lines, left). It started again by 1997 -- in the periphery on a line unconnected to the existing network (broken line in far southwest), instead of the highest priority southwestern and northeastern lines (in lighter blue, right)

Another infrastructural problem  for the city is the urgent need for cleaning up the environment, and to at long last tackle the management of water supply. And not least, there is the need to address issues of land use regulation and policy – the virtual absence of these currently gives a free hand to petty favour brokers and big speculators alike. Then there is the need for a serious attempt at building a public revenue basis to provide for the foregoing...
 

As regards the  immediate plans of the PT government in São Paulo: it will definitely take concrete steps towards participative budgeting; it will increase the autonomy of sub-municipal administrative bodies ('regionals'); it will increase investment in public transport rather than in road structures – although it is unlikely to be able to make a clear-cut decision on the Underground, and instead will remain bogged down with ideas (corridors, terminals, vans, minibuses, other extravagant variants) for improvements to the hopelessly saturated bus system; it will go some way towards overcoming both the general recourse to the scarcity refrain and the particular policy of concentrating investment in the high income south-west sector; and it will certainly increase investment in basic health and education. It will also probably try to lessen the extremely regressive nature of property taxes, and perhaps even to set up the long-debated policy of minimum income (broadly equivalent to unemployment benefit), although it is doubtful how much it will be able to achieve on these scores.

There is nothing certain about the outcome of such plans; and these thoughts about the electoral gains of the Workers' Party raise perhaps more doubts than they dispel. We may not be at the threshold of socialism. But there still is cause for celebration. This writer certainly did celebrate on election day and toasted the new mayor and her allies with friends. At the very least, they thought, we all will breathe slightly cleaner air for some time to come.

 

References

1  As put forward by Antonio Negri; see for instance his critique of  Bobbio's apology of liberal democracy in Capital & Class 37, pp.156-61
2  SCHWARZ, Roberto (1979) Um mestre na periferia do capitalismo Duas Cidades, São Paulo


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